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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Cornelison argued that the Idaho Supreme Court
denied him due process and equal protection when it denied his Motion to Augment the
record on appeal with various transcripts.

Mr. Cornelison argues that the requested

transcripts are necessary for his appeal because the district court could utilize its own
memory of the prior proceedings when it decided to revoke Mr. Cornelison's probation.
In response, the State argues that the only relevant transcripts are those from the final
probation admission hearing and the probation revocation hearing based on the new
standard of review articulated in State v. Morgan, 2012 Opinion No. 38 (Ct. App.
July 10, 2012) (not yet final).
This brief is necessary to address the Morgan opinion and the State's assertion
that only the transcripts of the final probation admission hearing and the probation
revocation hearing are relevant to the issues on appeal. Mr. Cornelison argues that the
requested transcripts are relevant because a district court can rely on its own memory
of the prior proceedings when it considers whether to revoke probation or reduce a
sentence. Since Idaho appellate courts conduct an independent review of the entire
record when determining whether a district court abused its discretion in regard to a
probation/sentencing determination, what the district court actually considered is
irrelevant.

The only questions are: whether the information at issue was before the

district court, and whether that information is relevant to the probation/sentencing issues
on appeal.
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Cornelison's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but
are incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUES

1

1.

Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Cornelison due process and equal
protection when it denied his Motion to Augment with the requested transcripts?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. Cornelison's
probation?1

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to reduce Mr. Cornelison's
sentence sua sponte upon revoking probation?

This brief will not address issues" and III.
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ARGUMENT
I.

The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Cornelison Due Process And Equal Protection
When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Appellate Record With Necessary
Transcripts

A.

Introduction
In Idaho, district courts consider a broad range of information when making

sentencing decisions.

Due to this broad range of information considered, Idaho

appellate courts have scrupulously required defendants to provide an extensive
appellate record because they conduct an independent review of the entire record
before the district court when determining whether an abuse of discretion occurred in
regard to a sentencing/probation determination. In other words, the question on appeal
generally does not focus on how or what the district court actually considered. Instead,
the central question is whether the record before the district court supports its
sentencing/probation determination.
Since Idaho appellate courts need to have all of the relevant information that was
before the district court to conduct this analysis, they will presume that any missing
information supports the trial court's determination and refuse to rule on the merits of
the issue. In some instances, the Court of Appeals has refused to address the merits of
issues on appeal due to the appellants' failure to provide transcripts of hearings which
occurred years before the disposition of the issue on appeal and were never discussed
by the district court.
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B.

In The Event This Case Is Assigned To The Court Of Appeals, The Court Has
The Authority To Address The Issues Raised In The Appellant's Brief

1.

The Idaho Rules Of Appellate Procedure Require The Idaho Court Of
Appeals To Address The Issues Raised In Mr. Costin's Appeal

In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Cornelison argued, for the first time in this appeal,
that the denial of his request for the transcripts violated the Fourteenth Amendment's
due process and equal protections clauses. (Appellant's Brief, pp.5-17.) In response
the State argued, based on State v. Morgan, 2012 Opinion No. 38 (Ct. App. July 10,
2012) (not yet final), that the Court of Appeals does not have the authority to address
Mr. Cornelison's due process argument because it would be tantamount to entertaining
an appeal from the Supreme Court. (Respondent's Brief, pp.6-7.) The State went on to
implicitly argue that Mr. Cornelison should file a renewed motion to augment with the
Court of Appeals in the event this case is assigned to that court. (Respondent's Brief,
pp.6-7.) Contrary to the State's assertion, Idaho Appellate Rule 108 requires the Court
of Appeals to rule on the merits of all cases to which it is assigned by the Supreme
Court. The relevant portions of I.A.R. 108 state as follows:
Cases ReseNed to Supreme Court. The Court of Appeals shall hear and
decide all cases assigned to it by the Supreme Court; provided that the
Supreme Court will not assign the following cases:
(1) Proceedings invoking the original jurisdiction of the Idaho
Supreme Court;
(2) Appeals from imposition of sentences of capital punishment in
criminal cases;
(3) Appeals from the Industrial Commission;
(4) Appeals from the Public Utilities Commission;
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(5) Review of the recommendatory orders of the Board of
Commissioners of the Idaho State Bar;
(6) Review of recommendatory orders of the Judicial Council.
(emphasis added). Since the issues raised in his Appellant's Brief do not fall into any of
the foregoing categories, the Idaho Court of Appeals has the authority to address the
issues raised in his Appellant's Brief.
Further, an assignment of this case to the Court of Appeals functions as an
implicit grant of authority from the Idaho Supreme Court to review Mr. Cornelison's
claims about the constitutionality of the merits of its decision to deny his request for the
transcripts. The Supreme Court will be aware of Mr. Cornelison's due process issue
when it makes it decision to either keep this appeal of assign it to the Court of Appeals.
This position is bolstered by the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court.
I.R.S.C. 21, which governs the assignment of cases.

Specifically,

The language of I.R.S.C. 21

follows:
Assignment of Cases. The chief justice (or designee) shall make the
tentative assignment of cases as between the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals. Copies of each assignment sheet shall be given to the
justices, affording each an opportunity to object and request the Court to
reconsider the assignment.

Any objection to the assignment shall be stated, with reasons, in writing
and circulated to all the justices.

At the request of any justice, the objection to the assignment shall be
taken up at conference.
The assignment of cases is not an arbitrary process; according to the rule, it is a
deliberate process which affords all the justices the ability to object and provide input
into the decision to assign a case to the Court of Appeals.
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Therefore, the Supreme

Court will be aware of Mr. Cornelison's due process and equal protection arguments
when it makes the decision to either keep this case or assign this case to the Court of
Appeals. In the event this case is assigned to the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court
will be implicitly granting the court authority to address the merits of Mr. Cornelison's
claims of error.
Additionally, the State implicitly asserted that Mr. Cornelison should file a
renewed motion to augment the record with the Court of Appeals in the event this case
is assigned to the Court of Appeals. (Respondent's Brief, pp.6-7.)

This assertion is

without merit because the Idaho Appellate Rules require all motions to be filed with the
Idaho Supreme Court. For example, Idaho Appellate Rule 110 states as follows:
All motions, petitions, briefs and other appellate documents, other than the
initial notice of appeal, shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court
as required by the Idaho Appellate Rules with the court heading of the
Supreme Court of the State of Idaho as provided by Rule 6. There shall be
no separate filings directed to or filed with the Court of Appeals. In the
event of an assignment of a case to the Court of Appeals, the title of the
proceeding and the identifying number thereof shall not be changed
except that the Clerk of the Supreme Court may add additional letters or
other notations to the case number so as to identify the assignment of the
case. All case files shall be maintained in the office of the Clerk of the
Supreme Court.
(emphasis added).

Furthermore, Idaho Appellate Rule 30 requires that all motions to

augment be filed with the Supreme Court. The relevant portions of I.A.R. 30 follow:
Any party may move the Supreme Court to augment or delete from the
settled reporter's transcript or clerk's or agency's record.

Unless otherwise expressly ordered by the Supreme Court such motion
shall be determined without oral argument. The reporter's transcript and
clerk's or agency's record may also be augmented or portions deleted by
stipulation of the parties and order of the Supreme Court.
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(emphasis added). Mr. Cornelison is not aware of any court rule which allows a party to
an appeal to file a motion directly with the Court of Appeals. Idaho Appellate Rule 110
expressly prohibits such filings. Therefore, the State's contention that Mr. Cornelison
could have filed a renewed motion to augment directly with the Court of Appeals is
contrary to the Idaho Appellate Rules.
In sum, when the Idaho Supreme Court assigns an appeal to the Idaho Court of
Appeals, the Idaho Appellate Rules require the Court of Appeals to decide all issues
addressed

in

that

appeal.

Even

though

Mr.

Cornelison

is

challenging

the

constitutionality of the Supreme Court's decision to deny his request for the transcripts,
an assignment of this case to the Court of Appeals functions as an implicit grant of
authority from the Idaho Supreme Court to review all issues raised in the Appellant's
Brief.

2.

An Assignment Of This Case to An Appellate Tribunal With No Authority
To Address Mr. Cornelison's Claims Of Error Will Violate His Right To
Procedural Due Process On Appeal

In the event the Idaho Supreme Court assigns this case to the Court of Appeals
and it determines that the Court of Appeals does not have the authority to address all of
the issues Mr. Cornelison'S raised in his appellant's brief, he argues, in the alternative,
that will function as a separate denial of his federal due process rights, which guarantee
him a fair appeal.

The Constitutions of both United States and the State of Idaho

guarantee a criminal defendant due process of law. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; 10.
CONST. art. I §13.
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965);
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the
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Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair."
Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servo of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24
(1981).
State

V.

Card, 121 Idaho 425, 445 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State

V.

Wood,

132 Idaho 88 (1998)). Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United
States Supreme Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United
States Constitution to art. I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Maresh v. State, 132
Idaho 221, 227 (1998) (citing Smith

V.

Idaho Dept. of Correction, 128 Idaho 768, 771

(1996)).
While there is no federal guarantee to an appeal from criminal state court
proceedings, after a state decides to provide appellate review, the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment are applicable during the
entirety of the appellate proceedings. Griffin

V.

Illinois 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956). In Idaho,

a criminal defendant's right to appeal is created by statute. See I.C. § 19-2801.
Additionally, an appeal from an order revoking probation is an appeal of right as defined
in Idaho Appellate Rule 11.

An order revoking probation is an order "made after

judgment affecting the substantial rights of the defendant." State v. Dryden, 105 Idaho
848, 852 (Ct. App. 1983).
In this case, Mr. Cornelison argues that due process protections apply to every
stage of his appeal. Those protections apply to any appellate procedural decision made
by the Idaho Supreme Court.

Even though Mr. Cornelison does not have an

independent right to appeal from the order denying his motion to augment, he can
challenge the constitutionality of the order because it is a procedural component of his

9

appeal and the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause applies to all procedures
affecting his appeal. If the Idaho Supreme Court assigns this appeal to the Idaho Court
of Appeals, knowing that the Court of Appeals had no authority to reverse an order of
the Supreme Court, a unique and independent procedural due process violation will
occur because the Supreme Court will have precluded Mr. Cornelison from any state
procedure by which he could raise his federal constitutional claims challenging the
denial of his motion to augment.

C.

The Morgan Decision Is In Conflict With Idaho Supreme Court Precedent
The State also argues that the requested transcripts are not relevant under the

standard of review articled in Morgan. However, the Morgan opinion changed the prior
standard of review in a manner which is inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent. In
1986, the Idaho Supreme Court reviewed an alleged due process violation during a
probation revocation proceeding. State v. Chapman, 111 Idaho 149 (1986). One of the
issues in that case involved the district court's reconsideration of evidence concerning
events that had occurred prior to the alleged probation violation. Id. at 153. Chapman
wanted to limit the district court's review to "only evidence subsequent to the original
probation decision." Id. (emphasis in the original). The Idaho Supreme Court rejected
that idea and stated, U[v]ery little information about a defendant will be irrelevant to the
effort of the law to individualize treatment of convicted persons." Id. (emphasis in the
original) (citations omitted). The Chapman Court noted that "[p]recluding consideration
of Chapman's conduct prior to his being placed on probation would unwisely skew the
trial court's consideration of the necessary facts which the court needs in order to
properly individualize its decision vis-a-vis him."
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Id.

Then, relying on State v.

Trowbridge, 95 Idaho 640 (1973), the Chapman Court identified a number of factors the

district court must consider when determining whether to continue a person on
probation.

Id. at 153-54. The Chapman Court also noted that a decision to place a

person on probation is not the same as a finding that a person is capable of
rehabilitation; instead, probation is a tool that the State may use to combat recidivism.
Id. at 154. The Court then identified a number of other factors the district court must
consider when making the decision of whether to continue with probation after it has
found a probation violation. Id.
More recently in 2010, the Idaho Supreme Court was specifically asked to
resolve the question of whether the district court abused its discretion when revoking
probation and ordering a suspended sentence into execution.
Idaho 1 (2010).

State v. Pierce, 150

Pierce argued that the sentence the district court executed was

excessive in light of the mitigating circumstances present in his case. Id. at 5-6. Before
reviewing the relevant facts, the Court noted that the "standard of review of a criminal
sentence is also well-established" and that the "Court conducts an independent review
of the entire record available to the trial court at sentencing." Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
Although the Idaho Supreme Court has never directly answered the question of
the scope of appellate review in jurisdictional relinquishment/probation revocation
proceedings, it has clearly indicated that the proper standard for the district court's
determination of what consequences should be passed on to an individual after finding
a violation of probation is review of the entire record. The Morgan Court's decision to
adopt a different standard of review appears to be in conflict with Idaho Supreme Court
precedent.

11

D.

The New Standard Of Review Articulated in Morgan Provides Little Guidance To
Counsel When Counsel Is Determining Which Transcripts Will Be Necessary For
An Appeal
The State argues that the requested transcripts are not necessary for this appeal

in reliance on the new standard of review articulated in Morgan. (Respondent's Brief,
pp. 7-8.) However, the Morgan standard of review provides little guidance for counsel
and, therefore, counsel must still request all of transcripts to provide for a meaningful
appeal and to prevent claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
The Court of Appeals' prior standard of review was articulated in State v.
Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 27 (Ct. App. 2009). In that case, the Idaho Court of Appeals

resolved an ongoing dispute about the proper standard of review in probation revocation
cases. Id. at 27. Relying on State v. Chacon, 146 Idaho 520, 524-25 (Ct. App. 2008),
and State v. Coffin, 122 Idaho 392 (Ct. App. 1992), the State sought to limit review to
only facts that had arisen between the original pronouncement of the sentence and the
revocation proceedings. Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28. Essentially, the State's position
would have eliminated any need for appellate courts to review the change of plea
hearing transcript, the sentencing transcript, and the presentence report because all of
that information would have been available to the district court prior to the original
sentencing hearing.

See id.

Hanington argued that the proper standard of review

should include a review of "all facts existing both at the time of the original sentence and
at the time the sentence is ordered into execution," relying on the standard established
in State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1055-1056 (Ct. App. 1989). Id. at 27. The Court of
Appeals agreed with Hanington and stated:
The State has read our somewhat differing versions of the scope of review
too restrictively. We have not intended to suggest that our review is limited
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solely to events occurring between the original imposition of sentence and
the decision to order the sentence into execution. When we review a
sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of probation, we
will examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the
original judgment. We base our review upon the facts existing when the
sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original
sentencing and the revocation of probation.
Id.

The Hannington Court made it clear that when determining what sentence to
execute, the appellate court would review the entire record, including the factors at the
original sentencing hearing through the probation revocation before the court on appeal.
The rationale behind this clarification makes perfect sense when looking once again to
State v. Adams, the decision that explained why the appellate courts should look to the
entire record when reviewing the executed sentence:
[W]hen we review a sentence ordered into execution after probation has
been revoked, we examine the entire record encompassing events before
and after the original judgment. We adopt this scope of review for two
reasons. First, the district judge, when deciding whether to order execution
of the original sentence or of a reduced sentence, does not artificially
segregate the facts into prejudgment and postjudgment categories. The
judge naturally and quite properly remembers the entire course of events
and considers all relevant facts in reaching a decision. When reviewing
that decision, we should consider the same facts. Second, when a
sentence is suspended and probation is granted, the defendant has scant
reason, and no incentive, to appeal. Only if the probation is later revoked,
and the sentence is ordered into execution, does the issue of an
excessive sentence become genuinely meaningful. Were we to adopt the
state's position that any claim of excessiveness is waived if not made on
immediate appeal from the judgment pronouncing but suspending a
sentence, defendants would be forced to file preventive appeals as a
hedge against the risk that probation someday might be revoked. We see
no reason to compel this hollow exercise. Neither do we wish to see the
appellate system cluttered with such cases.
State v. Adams, 115 Idaho at 1055-56. As such, when an appellate files an appeal from
an order revoking probation the applicable stand of review requires an independent and
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comprehensive inquiry to the events which occurred prior to as well as the events which
occurred during the probation revocation proceedings. The basis for this standard of
review is that the judge "naturally and quite properly remembers the entire course of
events and considers all relevant facts in reaching a decision."

Id.

The Court of

Appeals then stated that, "When reviewing that decision, we should consider the same
facts." Id.

The Court of Appeals did not state that the district court must expressly

reference the prejudgment events at the probation disposition hearing in order for this
standard of review to become applicable.

To the contrary, the Court of Appeals

assumed the judge will automatically consider the prejudgment events when
determining whether probation should be revoked.
In Morgan, the Court of Appeals narrowed its Hanington holding. (Opinion, p.4.)
The Court modified the standard, finding that it meant to indicate in Hanington that it
would not "arbitrarily confine" itself to the facts that have arisen since the original
sentencing hearing. Morgan, Opinion No. 38, p.4. The Morgan Court decided not to
examine the "entire record encompassing events before and after the original judgment
. .. facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between
the original sentencing and the revocation of probation" as required by Hanington, 148
Idaho at 28. Rather the Court of Appeals concluded that the "focus of the inquiry is the
conduct underlying the trial court's decision to revoke probation" and, therefore, would
"consider the elements of the record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of
probation issues which are properly made part of the record on appeal."
Opinion No. 38, p.4.

14

Morgan,

However, counsel has no real guidance in this appeal whether the requested
transcripts will be deemed relevant by the Court reviewing the Appellant's Brief. While
the Morgan opinion narrows the standard of review, all the prior proceedings are still
deemed relevant. The Morgan opinion just holds that the prior proceedings are less
relevant. However, there is no rule which controls how relevant a prior proceeding must
be in order for a transcript of that proceeding to be deemed necessary for the appeal.
In the event, the transcripts at issue were not requested there is no safeguard that the
reviewing Court will determine that they are relevant.

If an issue on appeal is not

addressed on the merits because counsel, in reliance on Morgan, decided to forego the
request for the transcripts, the appellant will lose his/her right to a meaningful appeal
and counsel will be deemed ineffective because the missing transcripts will be
presumed to support the district court's sentencing/probation decisions.
The State also argues, in reliance on Morgan, that Mr. Cornelison was not
denied due process because he could have filed an objection to the record in order to
get the request transcripts.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.10-11.)

In deciding whether

Morgan's rights were violated, the Court of Appeals held that because he could have
obtained the transcript without question during the objection to the record phase, he is
precluded from arguing that his Due Process rights were violated because the Court is
precluding him from augmenting the appellate record.

Morgan, Opinion No. 38, p.5.

However, this ignores the procedure the Idaho Supreme Court has adopted and made
available to all appellants to obtain transcripts that are needed to complete the appellate
record. See I.AR. 30. Idaho Appellate Rule 30 provides in part,
Any party may move the Supreme Court to augment or delete from the
settled reporter's transcript or clerk's or agency's record. Such a motion
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shall be accompanied by a statement setting forth the specific grounds for
the request and attaching a copy of any document sought to be
augmented to the original motion and to two copies of the motion which
document must have a legible filing stamp of the clerk indicating the date
of its filing, or the moving party must establish by citation to the record or
transcript that the document was presented to the district court. Any
request for augmentation with a transcript that has yet to be transcribed
must identify the name of the court reporter(s) along with the date and title
of the proceedings(s), and an estimated number of pages, and must
contain a certificate of service on the named reporter(s).
Through this procedure, the Idaho Supreme Court has allowed all parties to obtain
transcripts that need to be a part of the appellate record. If one must have completed
the appellate record by the time of the settlement stage under rule I.A.R. 28, then there
would be absolutely no need to have Rule 30.

Idaho Appellate Rule 30 is there to

ensure every opportunity is given to provide a completed record to the appellate court.
As recognized in State v. Rae, 139 Idaho 650,656 (Ct. App. 2004), the appellant could
ask to complete the appellate record by filing a motion under I.A.R. 30 to augment the
appellate record with the necessary missing transcripts.
Additionally, the State argues that Mr. Cornelison's arguments about State v.

Warren, 123 Idaho 20 (Ct. App. 1992), constitutes either a "misrepresentation" by
appellate counselor a "misunderstanding" of the Warren opinion because nowhere in

Warren "did the Court state that missing portions of the record were presumed to
support the district court's opinion."

(Respondent's Brief, p.9 n.1.)

Contrary to the

State's assertion, Mr. Cornelison neither lied about, nor misunderstood, the holding in

Warren.

In Warren, Mr. Warren was convicted of aggravated battery in 1988 and

placed on probation.

Id. at 21.

Mr. Warren's probation was then revoked and the

district court retained jurisdiction for 180 days.

Id.

After completing the period of

retained jurisdiction, Mr. Warren was placed on another period of probation, which was
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ultimately revoked.

Id.

The district court then sua sponte reduced the length of

Mr. Warren's sentence. Id. Mr. Warren then appealed and alleged that the district court
should have further reduced the length of his sentence. Id. In support of that position,
Mr. Warren argued that his probation violation was trivial.

Id.

In response to this

argument the Court of Appeals held as follows:
Warren incorrectly points to the nature of the probation violation by
arguing that his violation was trivial. This Court must look at the nature of
the original criminal offense, in this case aggravated battery where Warren
bit off his victim's ear. In regard to the character of the offender at the time
of the battery, the only fact in the record we have been presented on
appeal is that Warren had a drug problem. Warren "bears the burden of
presenting a record sufficient" for us to evaluate the merits of his claim.
State v. Wright, 114 Idaho 451,453,757 P.2d 714, 716 (Ct.App.1988)
(citing State v. Rundle, 107 Idaho 936, 694 P.2d 400 (Ct.App.1984). The
record on this appeal fails to contain the presentence investigation report
or transcript from the sentencing hearing on the battery conviction.
Without a more complete record and no argument by Warren as to why
the sentence was unreasonable we affirm the court's decision to reduce
his aggravated battery sentence to three years' fixed with ten years'
indeterminate. We also affirm the order denying the Rule 35 motion with
respect to this sentence.
Mr.

Cornelison

recognizes that the

Warren opinion does not use the word

"presumption", but that distinction is inapposite when the cases cited by the Court of
Appeals in the foregoing quote are reviewed. For example, the Warren Court cited to

State v. Rundle, 107 Idaho 936 (Ct. App. 1984), which held as follows:
The burden of showing that the original sentence was unduly severe is
upon the moving party. When a discretionary decision related to
sentencing is challenged on appeal, the appellant bears the burden of
presenting a sufficient record to evaluate the merits of the challenge. E.g.,
State v. Wolf, 102 Idaho 789, 640 P.2d 1190 (Ct.App.1982). Here, the
record is fatally incomplete. It does not contain the original sentence, the
presentence report (if any) or a transcript of any proceedings related to the
original sentence. The record consists primarily of Rundle's motion, the
district court's order, and an affidavit, accompanied by a memorandum,
stating reasons for the relief sought. These reasons are largely limited to
averments that Rundle has learned his lesson about obeying the law, that
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he has complied with regulations at the Idaho State Correctional Institution
and that further confinement would ill serve his rehabilitation or the welfare
of his family.
Id. at 937-38 (emphasis added). Rundle was cited in another Court of Appeals case,
State v. Fortin, 124 Idaho 323 (Ct. App. 1993). In that case, Mr. Fortin filed a Rule 35

motion requesting leniency. Id. at 327-23. In support of his motion, Mr. Fortin wanted
to submit testimony from a person who was with him on the night of his offense. Id. at
328.

The Court of Appeals made the following holding concerning this proposed

testimony:
Fortin stated in his motion that he wished to present the testimony
of Darin Walker, who was Fortin's passenger the night of the accident.
Fortin did not, in his motion or by affidavit, inform the district court what the
substance of Walker's testimony would be. This Court will not disturb the
district court's discretionary decision without any evidence that the
proffered testimony was relevant. Fortin bore the burden of presenting a
sufficient record to allow judicial evaluation of the merits of his Rule 35
motion. State v. Rundle, 107 Idaho 936, 937, 694 P.2d 400, 401
(Ct.App.1984); State v. Ramirez, 122 Idaho 830, 839 P.2d 1244
(Ct.App.1992). Having failed to make such a record, Fortin has not shown
that the district court abused its discretion by denying the motion without
admitting Walker's testimony.
Id.

In both Rundle and Fortin, the Court of Appeals held that it would not review the

merits of an appellate claim of error in the event the appellant fails to provide an
adequate record for review of that issue.

As such, Mr. Cornelison was not

misrepresenting or misunderstanding the holding of Warren, when he argued that "the
Warren opinion indicates that it would be presumed to support the district court's

decision to execute the original sentence," had Mr. Cornelison failed to request the
transcripts at issue. While the cases do not use the phrase "presumed to support the
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original sentencing decision,,,2 Warren, Rundle, and Fortin all hold that an appellate
claim of error will not be addressed on the merits in the event the appellant fails to
provide an adequate record to review the issue.
In sum, the Morgan opinion leaves appellate counsel guessing as to which
transcripts

will

be

needed

sentencing/probationary decisions.

to

provide

an

adequate

record

to

review

Morgan still says the entire record is relevant for

review of those issues, but the earlier proceedings are less relevant. Since the cases
such as Warren, Rundle, and Fortin were not overruled in Morgan, in order to ensure
that appellants will have the merits of their appellate claims addressed, appellate
counsel will have to continue to request all of the transcripts of the prior proceedings.

2 Later opinions have refined this standard. For example, in State v. Coma 133 Idaho
29 (ct. App. 1999), the Idaho Court of Appeals held, "[ilt is well established that an
appellant bears the burden to provide an adequate record upon which the appellate
court can review the merits of the claims of error, State v. Beck, 128 Idaho 416, 422,
913 P.2d 1186, 1192 (Ct.App. 1996); State v. Beason, 119 Idaho 103,105,803 P.2d
100.9, 1011 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Murinko, 108 Idaho 872, 873, 702 P.2d 910, 911
(Ct. App. 1985), and where pertinent portions of the record are missing on appeal, they
are presumed to support the actions of the trial court. State v. Repici, 122 Idaho 538,
541,835 P.2d 1349, 1352 (Ct. App. 1992)." Id. at 34.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Cornelison respectfully requests access to the requested transcripts and the
opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise
as a result of that review.

In the event this request is denied, Mr. Cornelison

respectfully requests that this Court remand this matter with instruction to place
Mr. Cornelison on probation. Alternatively, Mr. Cornelison respectfully requests that this
Court reduce the length of the indeterminate portion of his sentence.
DATED this 20 th day of November, 2012.

SHAWN F. WILKERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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